Although actions are usually governed by an explicit representation of the desired outcome, many behaviors, commonly called habits, do not appear to rely on such representations. Intuitively, habits are adaptive because they can free up attentional resources and automatize routine behavior, yet they can also be inflexible and even disruptive when environmental contingencies change. A striking example of the latter was given by James in 1890 in his classic chapter on habits: a discharged veteran, who upon hearing 'Attention!' brought his hands down to assume a military posture, and in so doing dropped the dinner he was carrying [1].
The key difference between habitual versus goaldirected actions is not the motor output per se, but how the action is generated. As noted by James, in voluntary actions, the outcome representation can somehow generate the behavior (ideomotor), whereas in habits, the triggering event appears to be the discriminative stimulus or the feedback associated with the completion of the previous behavior. To study this distinction experimentally, Dickinson and colleagues developed a clever approach. They trained rats to press a lever for food reward [2,3]. The reward outcome can then be 'devalued', whether by satiety or by taste aversion induction, so that the rats will no longer consume it voluntarily; they can then be tested in the absence of reward feedback in the devalued state, in order to measure the effect of devaluation on performance and the extent to which the generation of the action is based on outcome expectancy. Using these methods, it was found that, in some animals, devaluation drastically reduced performance relative to non-devalued condition, whereas in others it had little effect, that is lever pressing was just as likely as in the non-devalued state. Thus there appear to be two distinct modes of action control that can be experimentally dissociated. According to Dickinson, actions that are reduced by devaluation are goal-directed, whereas actions that persisted in spite of the devalued outcome are habitual. These operational definitions created a fruitful framework that enabled the design of experiments quantifying habitual and goal-directed behavior. Using this framework, studies have also shown that the major factors contributing to habit formation are prolonged training and certain schedules of reinforcement (see Box 1) [2] [3] [4] .
Studying the neural substrates of habits
The striatum, as the main input nucleus of the basal ganglia (BG), has long been implicated in procedural learning [5] [6] [7] [8] . Lesion and inactivation studies using the behavioral assays discussed above further established a crucial role of the striatum, suggesting that goal-directed actions require the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) whereas habits require the dorsolateral striatum (DLS) [9] [10] [11] [12] .
These initial findings raise several questions. Are separate neural circuits driving habitual and goal-directed performance? Since the striatum itself contains different cell populations that can be distinguished by connectivity and expression of receptors for neuromodulators, what are the local circuit mechanisms that change during habit formation? Recent studies taking advantage of new tools for selective monitoring and perturbation of neural activity have begun to address these questions.
Region-specific coordination of habitual behavior
Striatal subregions are known to receive inputs from distinct cortical regions [13, 14] . Gremel et al.
[15 ] employed a within-subject design using distinct discriminative stimuli for two different reinforcement schedules www.sciencedirect.com
